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Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)
In Welsh v. United States,' the Court reversed
the conviction of Elliott Ashton Welsh II for
failure to submit to induction, 2 holding that he
was entitled to an exemption as a conscientious
objector. In so holding, however, the Court further
added to the confused state of the law created by
its prior decision in United States v. Seeger.' More-
over, it failed to decide the constitutionality of
granting conscientious objector exemptions only
to those who are opposed to participation in war
in any form on the basis of "religious training and
belief" and not to those who may be opposed on
other grounds.
As in Seeger, the Court had to interpret § 6(j)
of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act,4 which at the time of Welsh's conviction
provided:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed
to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service in the armed forces of the
United States, who, by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code.
In Seeger the Court held that Congress, in referring
to a Supreme Being, "was merely clarifying the
meaning of religious training and belief so as to
embrace all religions and to exclude essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views," 5
and therefore did not intend to distinguish between
theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs. It also
1398 U.S. 333 (1970).
2 50 U.S.C. App., § 462 (a) (1964) provides:
Any member of the Selective Service System...
who otherwise evades or refuses registration or
service in the armed forces... shall, upon convic-
tion ... be punished by imprisonment for not
more than five years or a fine of not more than
$10,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment....
'380 U.S. 163 (1965).
4 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50
U.S.C. App., § 456 (j) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V,
1970).
5 380 U.S. at 165.
established a two-fold test for conscientious
objection: the given belief had to be sincerely held
and it had to occupy "a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption."' 6 In thus interpreting the statute,
the Court avoided Seeger's contention that it was
unconstitutional to differentiate between those
who object on grounds that are traditionally
considered to be religious and those who object
on secular grounds.
In Welsh four members of the Court again
avoided the issue. Justice Black, joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, did not reach
the constitutional question but reversed the
conviction because of its "fundamental incon-
sistency" 7 with Seeger. Justice Harlan, concurring
in the result, believed the constitutional issue
was squarely presented' and concluded that to
draw a line between religious beliefs and secular
beliefs would be a violation of the establishment
clause of the first amendment." Justice White,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart,
contended that Welsh should not be exempted
since his beliefs were not religious1' and concluded
that the judgment of Congress should not be
"frustrated" since the exemption had an "arguable
basis" in the free exercise clause."
The Selective Service application form used for
conscientious objector exemptions required the
registrant to sign the statement, "I am, by reason
of my religious training and belief, conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form." 12
Welsh signed the form only after crossing out the
words "my religious training and". 8 He charac-
terized his beliefs as having been formed by reading
in the fields of history and sociology 14 and in a
letter to his local board he said:
I can only act according to what I am and what
I see. And I see that the military complex wastes
' Id. at 166.
7398 U.S. at 335.
8 Id. at 345.
9 Id. at 356.10 Id. at 367.
u Id. at 371-72.
3Id. at 336-37.
13 Id. at 337.
"1 This characterization was reported by the Depart-
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both human and material resources, that it fosters
disregard for (what I consider a paramount con-
cern) human needs and ends; I see that the means
we employ to 'defend' our 'way of life' pro-
foundly change that way of life. I see that in our
failure to recognize the political, social, and
economic realities of the world, we, as a nation,
fail our responsibility as a nation.16
It was not until after the Court handed down
the Seeger decision that Welsh characterized his
beliefs in religious terms. 6 In a letter to his appeal
board" he said:
This, I suppose, is the crux of my problem of
explaining my beliefs in religious terms. Perhaps
I erred in taking such pains to point out that I
[do] not believe in the 'standard notion' of God.
I think my beliefs could be considered religious,
in the sense I have just explained [that 'both
ethical and religious values usually arise from
the same source: the individual's concern for
other individuals']. I do not call myself religious,
sinply because most people then assume that I
believe in God, in the conventional sense.'8
The court of appeals, presumably following
language used by the Supreme Court in Seeger,19
affirmed the conviction and held that since Welsh
had "constantly declared" that his beliefs stemmed
from sociological, economic, historical, and philo-
sophical considerations, the appeal board was
"entitled to take him at his word" in denying his
ment of Justice hearing officer who interviewed Welsh.
Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir.
1968).
16 398 U.S. at 342. Seeger characterized his objection
as based on a "belief in and devotion to goodness and
virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a
purely ethical creed." 380 U.S. at 166.
Is In his original application he stated he did not
believe in a Supreme Being, but in a letter sent to his
local board three months after Seeger was decided, he
asked that his original answer be striken and the ques-
tion left open. 398 U.S. at 337 n.3.
7 His local board classified him I-A-0, available for
noncombatant military service [32 C.F.R. § 1622.11
(1970)] and he appealed their refusal to classify him
I-0, available for civilian work "contributing to the
maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest,"
[32 C.F.R. § 1622.14 (1970)]. The appeal board classified
him I-A and his local board ordered him to report for
induction. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078,
1080-81 (9th Cir. 1968).
Is Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1091 (9th
Cir. 1968).
"9 The Court there held that "[in such an intensely
ersonal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that
is belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be
given great weight." 380 U.S. at 184.
request to be classified as a conscientious ob-
jector.20
Since the exemption is created by statute, a
court, in construing its scope, should inquire into
the intent of Congress in enacting the statute.
Unfortunately, however, an examination of the
legislative history does not yield a dear-cut answer
to that issue. The Draft Act of 1917 exempted
from combat service any person "found to be a
member of any well-recognized religious sect or
organization ... whose existing creed or principles
forbid its members to participate in war in any
form .... ," "1 Thus, only members of the traditional
peace churches were exempted. The Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940 broadened the
scope by exempting any person who "by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form." "
Under the 1940 provision, two opposing inter-
pretations developed. In a line of three cases the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit broadly
interpreted the exemption. In United States v.
Kauten," while affirming a conviction for neglecting
to appear for induction,24 the court characterized
conscientious objection as
a response of the individual to an inward mentor,
call it conscience or God, that is for many persons
at the present time the equivalent of what has
always been thought a religious impulse.25
The court in United States ex rel. Phillips v.
20 Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081-82
(9th Cir. 1968). judge Hamley dissented, arguing that
Welsh's disclaimer of a religious motivation was "pred-
icated upon a misunderstanding of the statutory
meaning of the term.. ." and that when he realized the
broad reading that Seeger gave to the word, he "made
it clear that he did have a religious motivation." Id. at
1091.
21 Act of May 18 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76. The
constitutionality of the act was upheld in Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.366 (1918). The Court gaveno
discussion to the argument that the exemptions violated
either the establishment or free exercise clauses, since
the argument's "unsoundness is too apparent to require
us to do more." Id. at 390.
During the Civil War members of religions that pro-
hibited the "bearing of arms" were to be given non-
combatant work or could be relieved of all duty by
paying $300. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat.
6.
22Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885.133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
4The hearing officer found Kauten's opposition to
be based in large part on his dislike of the Roosevelt
administration; the court held his beliefs were based on
"philosophical and political considerations" applicable




Douter,28 in holding that an exemption should
have been granted, noted that although the
registrant did not then belong to an organized
religion, he had early religious training in the
Presbyterian Church and "remembered" the
Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the
Sermon on the Mount. He had also read philos-
ophers, historians, and poets from Plato to Shaw,
but he was not sure from whom he derived his
opposition to killing.27 The scope of the exemption
was further broadened in United States ex rel.
Reel v. Badt,11 where the court held that one who
was opposed to war and killing as a result of study
of European and American history and the teach-
ings of his father but who did not believe in a god
should have been granted an exemption if it was
found that he objected to "participation in any
war under any circumstances because of the com-
pelling voice of his conscience ... . ,29
The Ninth Circuit refused to follow that trend,
denying in Berman v. United States ° an exemption
to one who was opposed to war "for the sake of
humanity and out of deep loyalty" to his fellow
citizens." In the court's opinion,
the expression 'by reason of religious training and
belief' is plain language, and was written into the
statute for the specific purpose of distinguishing
between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere
devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one
based upon an individual's belief in his responsi-
bility to an authority higher and beyond any
worldly one.n
In 1948 Congress amended the provision by
adding that religious training and belief meant
an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but does not include
any essentially political, sociological, or philosophi-
cal views or a merely personal moral code.n
The only real evidence of the intent of the
amendment is found in the report of the Senate
Armed Services Committee:
26 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
2 Id. at 523.
141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
29Id. at 849.
"156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
nId. at 379.
2Id. at 380.
M Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50
U.S.C. App., § 4560) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V,
1970).
This section reenacts substantially the same
provisions as were found in subsection 5 (g) of the
1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, be-
cause of religious training and belief in his rela-
tion to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed
to combatant military service or to both com-
batant and noncombatant military service. (See
United States v. Berman [sic], 156 F.2d 377, cer-
tiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795)."
Thus the question whether Congress intended
to adopt the interpretation of the Second or the
Ninth Circuit was squarely presented. In Welsh
Justice Black virtually ignored the statute, relying
on the Court's interpretation of it in Seeger 5
and applying the conscientious objection test
established in that decision."8 justice Harlan
re-examined the provision and concluded not only
that Congress did not intend that those with
beliefs such as Welsh's be exempted, but also that
his joining in the Seeger opinion was error." Justice
" S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948):
The language appears to be derived in part from the
Berman decision, which quoted from the dissent of
Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931), that the "essence of religion
is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation." Berman v.
United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946).
35Thr the Court placed emphasis on the language
of the Senate report that the amendment was intended
to "substantially" reenact the 1940 provision and the
statement of Senator Gurney that the provision followed
the 1940 act with "very few technical amendments"
and concluded that the amendment continued "the
congressional policy of providing exemption from mili-
tary service for those whose opposition is based on
grounds that can fairly be said to be 'religious.' 380
U.S. at 178-80.
38 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
3 398 U.S. at 344. While he joined in Seeger, justice
Harlan changed his opinion as to the intent of the 1948
amendment, concluding that Congress intended to
"annoint" the Ninth Circuit's interpretation. Id. at
349.
The legislative history of the amendment is so scant
that it lends little support to either the Seeger interpre-
tation or that of justice Harlan. Aside from the history
cited in Seeger, there is no evidence that Congress even
considered what characteristics it intended conscien-
tious objectors to have or that it was aware of the con-
flict between the second and ninth circuits. The only
characterization of conscientious objectors was made by
Senator Morse during debate on his amendment to
establish a National Commission on Conscientious Ob-
jectors, which was not at all related to the amendment
in question:
We have never shared their religious experience, we
have never shared the spiritual drive which has
conditioned them to form the conviction which
causes them to say as a matter of religious scruple,
'Loving my country as I do, I love my God more,
and I believe that, as a matter of religious faith, I
19701
SUPRFME COURT REVIEW
White left open the question whether he was
wrong in Seeger,n but concluded that Welsh
belonged to a class of persons to whom Congress
"has expressly denied an exemption." 11
The government argued that Welsh could be
distinguished in that the second requirement of
the Seeger test was not met for two reasons:"
1) because Welsh was more insistent than Seeger
in denying his views were religious,n and 2) be-
cause Welsh's views were "essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code." 42 As to the first contention
Justice Black agreed with the dissenting judge
below4 3 and held that
very few registrants are fully aware of the broad
scope of the word 'religious' as used in § 6 0),
and accordingly a registrant's statement that his
beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable
guide for those charged with administering the
exemption. 44
The expanding effect of Welsh is difficult to
particularize but can be seen from comparing
language used by justice Black in answering the
government's second contention with the language
of Seeger. In the latter case the Court said:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the
expression 'Supreme Being' rather than the
designation 'God,' was merely clarifying the
meaning of religious training and belief so as to
embrace all religions and to exclude essentially politi-
cal, sociological, or philosophical views.
04
The use by Congress of the words 'merely per-
sonal' seems to us to restrict the exception to a
moral code which is not only personal but which
is the sole basis for the registrant's belief and is in
no way related to a Supreme Being.
46
In Welsh justice Black, while maintaining a
would not be true to my God if I fought my fellow
men in war.'
94 CONG. REc. 7304 (1948) (remarks of Senator Morse).
18 398 U.S. at 367.
9IId. at 368.
40 The first requirement-that the beliefs be sincerely
held-was not at issue since the government conceded
that Welsh's beliefs were held "with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions." Welsh v. United
States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1968).41398 U.S. at 341.
42Id. at 342.
'3 See note 20 supra.
44 398 U.S. at 341.
46 380 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 186.
"fundamental" consistency with Seeger, abandoned
the 'religious'-moral code distinction:
We certainly do not think § 6 (j)'s exclusion of
those persons with 'essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code should be read to exclude those who
hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign
affairs or even those whose conscientious objec-
tion to participation in all wars is founded to a
substantial extent upon considerations of public
policy. 47
That section exempts from military service all
those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them
no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to
become a part of an instrument of war.0
The effect of Welsh thus appears to be that now a
registrant can qualify for an exemption even if his
beliefs are based solely on a moral code. The two
groups which Justice Black held "obviously"
not exempted were those whose beliefs were not
deeply held (a requirement previously established
in Seeger) and "those whose objection to war does
not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious
principle but instead rests solely upon considera-
tions of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." 4 9
The problem is that Justice Black did not define
"moral code," which now qualifies one for an
exemption, nor "policy, pragmatism, or expedi-
ency," which, if the sole basis for the objection,
may not qualify one for the exemption. Thus it is
difficult to state how far the exemption has been
broadened. The only requirement which is clear
from the opinion is that the registrant must be
opposed to all wars. 0
The opinion of Justice Black must be criticized
for at least two reasons: it stretched the meaning
of the statute beyond the reasonable intent of
Congress, and it has again erected standards that
are confusing and difficult to apply Granting that
47 398 U.S. at 342.
48 Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 342-43.
00 In stating the requirement, justice Black twice
referred to "all wars" and once to "any war at any
time." 398 U.S. at 340, 342. The issue of objection to a
particular war was directly presented in United States v.
Sisson, 297 F. Supp 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), where the district court
held that granting exemptions to those opposed to
war on religious grounds but not to one opposed to the
Vietnam War was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. _Q
[Vol. 61
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it may be reasonable to interpret the 1948 amend-
meat as not really altering the prior "religious
training and belief" provision of the 1940 act, as
the Court in Seeger and implicitly Justice Black
in Welsh did, it is even more reasonable to assume
that Congress, in using the term "religious," did
not intend to include the fields of sociology and
history, upon which Welsh said he based his
beliefs 1 Had Congress intended such bases to
fall within the exemption, surely in 1940 it would
have been more explicit than merely broadening
the exemption from those belonging to the peace
churches to all those with objections based on
"religious training and belief." As Justice Harlan
characterized it, the prevailing opinion performed
a "lobotomy" 52 on the statute in order to avoid
51 Such a contention finds some support in the reac-
tion of Congress to the Seeger decision. In 1967, two
years after Seeger, Congress amended the provision
by deleting the reference to a 'Supreme Being.' Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.
App., § 456 (j) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 50 U.S.C.
App., § 456 (j) (1964). Seeger was characterized as a
"significant broadening" of the exemption [H. R. REP.
No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1967)] and most
congressmen believed the amendment was intended
to restrict that interpretation. See, e.g., 113 CoNG. Rxc.
15426 (1967) (remarks of Senator Russell); 113 CONG.
REc. 15429 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kennedy);
113 CoNG. Rxec. 15778 (1967) (remarks of Senator
McCarthy); 113 CONG. Rxec. 16436 (1967) (remarks of
Representative Reid); 113 CoNG. Rxec. 16436 (1967)
(remarks of Representative Curtis).
52398 U.S. at 351.
Gutnecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970);
reaching the consitituional issue and in so doing
took an analytically unsound approach.53
The failure to define the outer limits of the
exemption-policy, pragmatism, or expediency--
leaves local boards and lower courts with no more
than vague guidelines for granting exemptions.4
The effect of the decision is further confused since
there was no indication what retroactive effect
it was intended to have.55 The decision, moreover,
may well result in discrimination in favor of the
college educated, who can point to study of history,
sociology, and the like, as Welsh did, to justify
their beliefs.5"
53 Id. at 355.
54 The Selective Service System has not attempted to
define the terms used by justice Black, but has directed
that the belief upon which the objection is based must
be the "primary controlling force" in the registrant's
life. He must also be able to demonstrate that his con-
victions were "gained through training, study, con-
templation, or other activity, comparable in rigor and
dedication to the processes by which traditional religious
convictions are formulated." Selective Service System,
Local Board Memo. No. 107, July 6, 1970.
One Chicago newspaper reported that all five mem-
bers of a local board resigned after Welsh because that
decision made draft policies "unworkable." Chicago
Daily News, July 28, 1970, at 24, col. 2.
55 The problem is further complicated in that the
more recent cases will involve the 1967 amendment,
which was not in question in Welsh. See note 51 supra.56 The Selective Service System has recognized this
possibility and has directed that local boards should
examine the sincerity of the registrant and not give
"particular advantage" to one who is "learned or glib."
Selective Service System, Local Board Memo. No. 107,
July 6, 1970.
Breen v. Selective Service, Local Board No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970)
Last term the Supreme Court handed down two
decisions adjudicating the validity of the delin-
quency regulations' of the Selective Service System
as promulgated under 32 C.F.R. Part 1642 (Supp.
1967). The two cases, Gutknect v. United States2
and Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16' are
related to the 1968 case of Oestereich v. Selective
Service System Local Bd. No. 11.4 Together, these
132 C.F.R. § 1602.4 (Supp. 1967) defines a delinquent
as
... a person required to be registered under the
selective service law who fails or neglects to perform
any duty required of him under the provisions of
the selective service law.
2396 U.S. 295 (1970).
3 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
'393 U.S. 233 (1968).
three cases have invalidated delinquency regula-
tions insofar as they have been employed as a
basis for the reclassification of exempt or deferred
registrants, or for the acceleration of their in-
duction.
Cases challenging reclassification and accelerated
induction under these delinquency regulations
represent a recent phenomenon.5 As early as
United States v. Hertlein,6 however, a lower federal
court dealt with the question of the accelerated
induction of a defendant who had failed to report
5The majority of the cases concerned with these
aspects of the Selective Service laws have occurred in
conjunction with the increase in vocal opposition to the
involvement of the United States in Viet Nam.
6143 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1956).
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for an Armed Forces physical examinationY
There the government argued that the Selective
Service System was authorized under the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act of 1948
"to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations
to carry out the provisions of this title.. ." ,
Regulations so promulgated state that
[wihenever a registrant has failed to perform
any duty or duties required of him under the
selective service law ... the local board may
declare him to be delinquent.9
The district court accepted the position of the
government--since the defendant had failed to
report for his physical examination, he became a
"delinquent" and was subject to immediate
induction O
Hertlein had been reclassified I-A (available
for military service) from class I-A-0 (conscien-
tious objector available for noncombatant military
service only) once his local draft board declared
him "delinquent." 11 The import of delinquent
status is established in a regulation which deals
with the order of call of registrants available for
military service. 2 This section stipulates that
felach local board, upon receiving a Notice of
Call ... from the State Director of Selective
Service (1) for a specified number of men to
be delivered for induction ... shall select and
order to report for induction the number of men
required to fill the call from among its registrants
who have been classified in Class I-A and Class
I-A-0 and have been found acceptable for service
in the Armed Forces and to whom the local
board has mailed a Statement of Acceptability
... Provided, that a registrant classified in Class
I-A or Class I-A-0 who is delinquent may be
selected and ordered to report for induction
to fill an induction call not-withstanding the
7Hertlein also returned his registration certificate
and five classification notices to his local draft board.
32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 and 1623.5 (Supp. 1967) respectively
require a registrant to have in his personal possession
at all times a registration card and a valid notice of
classification.
8 50 U.S.C. App., § 460(b) (1) (1968).
9 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (Supp. 1967).
10 143 F. Supp. at 745. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.13 (Supp.
1967) authorizes the local board to "... order each
delinquent registrant ... who is classified in or re-
classified into class I-A or class I-A-O to report for
induction in the manner provided in section 1631.7 of
this chapter ......
U 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4 (Supp. 1967) also provides that
a ... delinquent may be removed from that status
by the local board at any time."
"32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(a) (Supp. 1967).
fact that he has not been found acceptable for
service... and has not been mailed a Statement of
Acceptability.... Such registrants ... shall be
selected and ordered to report for induction in
the following order:
(1) Delinquents who have attained the age of
19 years in the order of their dates of birth with the
oldest being selected first.
(2) Volunteers ....
The district court never examined the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act of 1948
nor questioned the statutory authority of the
delinquency regulations which it affirmed. The
authority of the local board to declare a registrant
delinquent and to accelerate his induction re-
mained undisturbed.
Ten years later, a significant challenge to the
delinquency regulations was raised in Wills v.
United States.1 4 The appellant was reclassified
from IH-S (student deferment) to I-A upon the
declaration that he was "delinquent." 15 He was
ordered to report for induction but refused. Con-
victed for failure to submit to induction, he ap-
pealed. Appellant challenged his induction order
on the basis that it was the result of a delinquency
declaration designed to punish him for the de-
struction of his registration card. The court of
appeals dismissed his claim stating that the "de-
struction is, in fact, no more than a willful and
defiant refusal to possess" in violation of the regula-
tions.'6 Conviction for refusal to submit to in-
duction was thus affirmed.
The defendant in United States v. Comstock'?
also alleged that his reclassification from 11-S
to I-A in accordance with delinquency regulations
was punitive in nature. The district court answered
the claim of the defendant stating that,
[i]n the only cases in which this question has
been squarely presented, it has been consistently
held that the classification or reclassification of a
registrant for military service in no way can be
considered punitive in nature.16
IsThe four final categories of registrants available
for military service are ranked according to the age and
marital status of the registrant. Defendant Hertlein
might have been classified in one of these four remaining
categories, but was accelerated into the first category
in light of his delinquency status.
14 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967).
15 The defendant was declared delinquent for willfully
destroying his registration certificate and for informing
the local draft board of his refusal to carry another.
Id. at 943.
Is384 F.2d at 947. 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (Supp. 1967).
"296 F. Supp. 480 (D. Conn. 1969).
Is Id. at 484. The case upon which the court relied
[Vol. 61
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The lower federal courts in cases through Con
stock, dismissed claims that the delinquency
regulations were being invoked in a punitive
manner.19 These decisions assumed that those
regulations were congressionally authorized under
the Universal Military Training and Service Act
of 194820 and were therefore properly invoked.
Even as lower federal courts continued to uphold
the application of delinquency regulations, the
Supreme Court considered the issue in Oestereich
v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11.21
The case dealt with the reclassification of a the-
ological student from IV-D to I-A after a declara-
tion of delinquency for his failure to retain posses-
sion of his registration certificate.2 2 The Court
reversed the conviction of the defendant stating
that the exemption of the student was mandatory
by statute.23
Once a person registers and qualifies for a
statutory exemption, we find no legislative au-
thority to deprive him of that exemption because
of conduct or activities unrelated to the merits of
granting or continuing that exemption.24
Nor, asserted the Court, had Congress defined
"delinquent status" in the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 194825 or laid down
guidelines for placing a registrant in that category
for his failure to adhere to the rules and regulations
of the Selective Service System.2 6 The local board
had exceeded its authority.
was Nicherson v. United States, 391 F.2d 760 (10th
Cir. 1968). The court stated that the record of the
defendant showed a flagrant disregard for the orders of
the local board for a period of over two years. The
defendant was reclassified and ordered for induction.
The judgment was affirmed.
19In United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225
(S.D. N.Y. 1969), the delinquency regulations, under
which one defendant was reclassified and another was
accelerated into induction, were attacked as being
employed in a punitive manner. The district court
stated, however, that a determination of the legality of
the delinquency regulations would have to await a full
presentation upon a trial of factual context.
20 50 U.S.C. App., §§ 451-473 (1964).
21393 U.S. 233 (1968).
-' 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 requires that every registrant
have in his personal possession at all times his registra-
tion certificate.
2 50 U.S.C. App., § 456(g) (1964) provides that
... students preparing for the ministry under the
direction of recognized churches ... who are satisfac-
torily pursuing full-time courses of instruction in
recognized theological schools.., shall be exempt from
training and service...."
21393 U.S. at 237.
2 50 U.S.C. App., §§ 451-473 (1964).
26393 U.S. at 236-237. In the wake of Oestereich,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard Ander-
The Court did not confront delinquency issues
again until Gutknecht v. United States.27 This case
involved a registrant who returned his registration
and classification cards to his draft board while
his I-A classification was being appealed to the
state appeal board. His classification as I-A
was subsequently affirmed. The local board then
declared him delinquent for failure to retain pos-
session of his certificates,25 Delinquency status
advanced the petitioner in the order of call.29
Six days later he was told to report for induction,
but he ignored the call which led to his indictment
for "willful and knowing failure to perfoim a
duty." 0 He was convicted and the decision was
affirmed in the Court of Appeals" for the Eighth
Circuit which distinguished Oestereich by stating
that it was not confronted with an illegal reclassi-
fication which revoked a statutory exemption.
Nor was the reclassification punitive since the
son v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969), dealing
with "deferred" II-S registrants who were reclassified
I-A after being declared "delinquents." The court
distinguished the case from Oestereich: Congress had
provided that exempt registrants would remain outside
the available manpower pool for military service,
whereas deferred registrants were not immune from the
possibility of serving. The reclassification of the de-
fendants upon a declaration of delinquency was con-
strued to be within the authority and power of the
local board when dealing with a deferred registrant as
compared with an exempted registrant. The judgment
was affirmed.
Kolden v. Selective Service Ed. No. 4, 406 F.2d 631
(8th Cir. 1969) also dealt with the same problems. The
defendant turned in his registration card to his local
draft board and was reclassified I-A and ordered to
report for induction. He contended that his reclassifica-
tion was illegal because the declaration of delinquency
and subsequent reclassification were punitive in nature.
Id. at 632. The court dismissed these allegations, stating
that because the defendant did not fall within a statu-
torily exempted class similar to that in Oestereich, the
reclassification and induction order were not illegal.
396 U.S. 295 (1970).
s 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (Supp. 1967) states that "[e]very
person required to present himself for and submit to
registration must, after he is registered, have in his
personal possession at all times his Registration Certifi-
cate. .. ."
2OIn accordance with 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (Supp.
1967) which establishes the order of call as follows: (1)
delinquents, (2) volunteers, (3) unmarried registrants
between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six.
3 50 U.S.C. App., § 462(a) (1964) states that
[a]ny member of the Selective Service System or
any other person charged as herein provided with
the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of
this title... or the rules or regulations made or
directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly
fail or neglect to perform such duty.., shall upon
conviction in any district court of the United
States ... be punished by imprisonment for not
more than five years....
- 406 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1969).
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defendant had not been deprived of a right granted
to him by statute.2 The court of appeals concluded
that Congress had properly authorized the delin-
quency regulations under 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)
(1) (1964) which stated that
the term 'prime age group' means the age group
which has been designated by the President or the
age group from which selection for induction into
the Armed Forces are first to be made after de-
linquents and volunteers, (emphasis added).
This decision of the Eighth Circuit was reversed
by the Supreme Court on a number of grounds.
Primarily concerned with the finding of the lower
court of statutory authority for operation of the
delinquency regulations, Mr. Justice Douglas, in
writing for the majority, stated that he had
searched the Universal Military Training and
Service Act" in vain for any clues that Congress
intended the Act to provide punitive sanctions
for "delinquents." 4
There is nothing to indicate that Congress
authorized the Selective Service System to re-
classify exempt or deferred registrants for puni-
tive purposes and to provide for accelerated
induction of delinquents. Rather, the Congress
reaffirmed its intentions under § 12 (50 U.S.C
App. § 462 (1964 ed., Supp. IV)) to punish de-
linquents through the criminal law.6
In addition, the delinquency regulations had
been created in the absence of any statutory stand-
ard or guideline. The power to declare a registrant
2Id. at 497.
"150 U.S.C. App. (1964).
34 In United States v. Branigan 299 F. Supp. 225
(S.D. N.Y. 1969), the court confronted the same prob-
lems, but leaned toward a different conclusion.
As for the statutory claim, it is true there is no
express congressional authorization for the delin-
quency regulations, but Congress did authorize
the promulgation of 'the necessary rules and regula-
tions' to carry out the provisions of the Act. And in
1967 Congress, in amending the Act, recognized
the existence of the delinquency regulations. Id.
at 236.
36396 U.S. at 302. 50 U.S.C. App., § 462(a) (1964)
states that
[a]ny member of the Selective Service System or
any other person charged as herein provided with
the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of
this title ... or the rules or regulations made or
directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly
fail or neglect to perform such duty... shall upon
conviction in any district court of the United
States ... be punished by imprisonment for not
more than five years....
delinquent, then, was being exercised solely at
the discretion of the local board. 6
If the Supreme Court was concerned with the
lack of congressional authority for delinquency
regulations, it was likewise troubled by the manner
in which the local boards applied them. Whereas
similar allegations had been raised without at-
tention in the past,u the Court here implicitly
recognized that those regulations might be utilized
by local boards to punish anti-war demonstrators.*
Indeed, Justice Douglas emphasized that "[d]efer-
ment of the order of call may be the bestowal of
great benefits; and its acceleration may be ex-
tremely punitive." 11
Congress had not authorized the delinquency
regulations or sanctioned punitive measures other
than criminal prosecutions;" nor did the regu-
lations have any prescribed system of standards. 2
The Court concluded that if punitive induction was
to be substituted for prosecution, then a vast
rewriting of the Act would be necessary.2
The decision in Breen v. Selective Service Local
36 The court stated that
[t]he power under the regulation to declare a
registrant 'delinquent' has no statutory standard
or even guidelines. The power is exercised entirely
at the discretion of the local board. It is a broad
roving authority, a type of administrative absolu-
tism not congenial to our law-making traditions.
396 U.S. at 306.
37 Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.
1967); United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225
(S.D. N.Y. 1969); and United States v. Comstock, 296
F. Supp. 480 (D. Conn. 1969).
8 The majority of the cases cited in this note con-
cerned registrants who protested American involvement
in Viet Nam by voluntarily dispossessing themselves of
their registration and/or classification cards. See, e.g.,
Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967),
Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11,
393 U.S. 233 (1968).
19 396 U.S. at 304.
10 The Supreme Court did not interpret 50 U.S.C.
App., § 456(h) (1) (1964) as authorizing the delinquency
regulations or allowing local boards to punish violators
of the Act. The Court stated that the "... casual
mention of the term 'delinquents'. . . must be measured
against the explicit congressional provision for criminal
punishment of those who violate the selective service
laws." 396 U.S. at 302.
41Without any standards or guidelines to follow, a
local board could act arbitrarily in declaring registrants
delinquents; and it was just such action to which the
Court objected most strongly. See Gutknecht v. United
States 396 U.S. 295, 306 (1970).
4 Mr. justice Stewart, in writing a concurring
opinion, stated that hefelta determination of the validity
of the delinquency regulations was unnecessary. He
concluded that the local board had denied petitioner
the right to appeal his delinquency declaration and
that he would have reversed the decision on that basis.
Gutknecht v. United States 396 U.S. 295, 319 (1970).
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Bd. No. 1643 was announced within a week of
Gidkneclt. Breen had been reclassified from II-S
to I-A under delinquency regulations for failure
to retain personal possession of his registration
card." He filed suit in district court seeking to
enjoin possible induction on the grounds that his
reclassification was invalid. That court granted a
motion by the local board to dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction. 45 A court of appeals affirmed
the decision,46 stating that they were not faced
with a statutory exemption as in Oestereich. Rather,
the case involved a deferment granted at the discre-
tion of the local board. a The Supreme Court
reversed that ruling.
Mr. justice Black, speaking for the majority,
stated that the court of appeals had improperly
concluded that Congress authorized the revocation
of deferments for violators of the delinquency
regulations, for 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(1) (1964)
provided that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
the President shall ... provide for the deferment
from training and service in the Armed Forces
of persons satisfactorily pursuing a full-time
course of instruction at a college....
The Court went on to state that
[t]he legislative history of § 6(h)(1) clearly in-
dicates that Congress intended only the condi-
43 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
4432 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (Supp. 1967) requires every
registrant to have in his personal possession his registra-
tion certificate at all times.
41 The local board based its motion upon the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 104 § 10(b) (3),
which states that
[n]o judicial review shall be made of the classifi-
cation or processing of any registrant by local
boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a
defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under
section 12 of this title, after the registrant has
responded either affirmatively or negatively to an
order to report for induction....
The Supreme Court had faced this provision in
Oestereich. Justice Douglas stated that preinductionjudicial review was not precluded in cases involving a
plain and unequivocal exemption, 383 U.S. at 238-239.
46 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969).
47 50 U.S.C. App., § 456(g) (1964) states that students
preparing for the ministry "... shall be exempt from
training and service.. ." (emphasis added), whereas
§ 456(h) (1) provides ".... for the deferment from train-
ing and service... of persons... at a college...
(emphasis added). The Attorney General argued that
... a rational distinction exists in the statutory
scheme between deferments which merely postpone the
time when a registrant will serve and exemptions which
place the registrant 'outside the manpower pool.'"
396 U.S. at 466. The Court dismissed this argument.
tions specified in that section need be met to
warrant a student deferment.... Congress did
not specifically provide, or in any way indicate
that such deferred status could be denied because
the registrant failed to possess his registration
certificate.4
The Court reached the same conclusion as it
had in Oestereich-the local board had illegally
revoked a deferment and ordered the registrant
for induction. 4 The Attorney General argued,
however, that this case was different from Oestereich
since the former dealt with a deferment and the
latter with an exemption, stating that ". .. a
rational distinction exists in the statutory scheme
between deferments which merely postpone the
time when a registrant will serve and exemptions
which place the registrant 'outside the manpower
pool.' "50 The Court did not find this argument
persuasive since 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(k) states
that "[n]o... exemption or deferment... shall
continue after the cause therefor ceases to exist."
The effect of an exemption or a deferment is the
same-the registrant is not presently subject to
induction. Therefore, the Court was unable to
find any congressional intent to permanently
exempt certain registrants from military service
while only deferring such service for others.'
For these reasons the Court was unable to dis-
tinguish the case of Breen from that of Oestereich.
In both situations a draft registrant who was
required by the relevant law not to be inducted
was in fact ordered to report for military service.
In both cases the order for induction involved a
clear departure by the Board from its statutory
mandate .... 02
Gutknechl and Breen thus held that local draft
boards could not themselves punish violators of
the Selective Service Regulations.0 The Court in
effect barred the arbitrary use of administrative
authority by local boards not delegated to them
by Congress. Interestingly enough, the Court in
Gutknecht quoted from the Brief of the Solicitor
General in Oesterekh.
It is difficult to believe that Congress intended
48 396 U.S. at 465.
49 Id. at 467.60 Id. at 466.
51lId. at 467.
52 396 U.S. at 467.
53 As a result of Breen, the decision in Anderson v.
Hershey, 410 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969) and Kolden v.
Selective Service Bd. No. 4, 406 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.
1969) were vacated and remanded.
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the local boards to have the unfettered direction
to decide that any violation of the Act or regula-
tions warrants a declaration of delinquency, re-
classification and induction .... 64
In light of Gutknecht and Breen, one may con-
clude with some certainty that federal court treat-
" 396 U.S. at 302-303.
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970)
In Toussie v. United States' the Court held that a
failure to register for the draft at the proclaimed
time' is a crime of single instance which immedi-
ately tolls the statute of limitations.' In so ruling,
the Court reversed an earlier line of decision and
offered a much needed definition for the doctrine
of "continuing offense"-a principle by which the
limitations period as applied to a crime is extended
by deferring its initiation.
Toussie was convicted4 under authority of sec-
tion 12a of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, 5 which makes it a crime to "neglect
or refuse to perform any duty" required by the
Selective Service laws. Section 3 of that Act states
that:
... it shall be the duty of every male citizen ...
who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any
subsequent registration, is between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and
submit to registration at such time or times and
place or places, and in such manner, as shall be
determined by proclamation of the President and
by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.6
Registration day was proclaimed by the Presi-
dent to be "the eighteenth anniversary of the day
1397 U.S. 112 (1970).
2 Proclamation 92942, 65 Stat. 35 (1951), states that
"[persons who were born on or after September
19, 1930, shall be registered on the day they attain
the eighteenth aniversary of the day of their birth,
or within five days thereafter."
3 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964) states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law no
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for
any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is
found... within five years after such offense shall
have been committed.
4 United States v. Toussie, 280 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967), ajt'd, 410 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
granted, 396 U.S. 875 (1969).
S 50 U.S.C. App., § 462a (1964).
6 50 U.S.C. App., § 453 (1964).
ment of the subsequent cases involving delinquency
and reclassification matters will entail scrutiny of
the authority of the local boards to undertake any
administrative steps in issue. The exercise by a
local board of its powers to direct the Selective
Service System in an arbitrary fashion is obviously
weakened by reason of these decisions.
of... birth, or within five days thereafter." 7
Toussie, born on June 23, 1941, was required to
register between June 23 and June 28, 1959. He
refused to comply. An indictment, however, was
barred by the five year statute of limitations.8 The
government asserted that the failure to register was
an offense which continued until age twenty-six.
In its view, the five-year statute of limitations
would not have run until five days after Toussie's
thirty-first birthday in 1970. The prosecution
buttressed its argument with reference to a Presi-
dential order that read:
The duty of every person subject to registration
to present himself for and submit to registration
shall continue at all times, and if for any reason
any such person is not registered on the day or
one of the days fixed for his registration, he shall
immediately present himself for and submit to
registration. (emphasis added) 9
A 1967 indictment was, in the government's
view, wholly proper. The determinative issue was,
therefore, whether or not failure to register for the
draft was a "continuing offense."
Speaking for the majority in Toussie,15 Mr.
Justice Black pointed out that there is a tension
between the "continuing offense" doctrine1 and
7Proclamation 9 2942, 65 Stat. 35 (1951).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964).
832 C.F.R. § 1611.7c (1970).
10 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
"A "continuing offense" denotes not only a crime
which has been consumated in the past and could then
have been prosecuted, but also a continuing course of
criminal conduct necessary to further one complete
design. The "continuing offense" must be distinguished
from that of the instantaneous crime, the single event,
which may be continuing only in result or effect. For
example, the crime of conspiracy to defraud may have
been consummated at the time of the original agree-
ment, but because of the execution of a series of fraudu-
lent letters necessary to further the plot, the offense is
continuous. Contrast however the crime of theft which
is complete upon the taking of another's property with
the necessary intent; the retention of the property con-
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the purpose of the statute of limitations. The latter
is a matter of legislative grace,2 and stands for
the proposition that it is necessary to limit an
individual's exposure to criminal prosecution. The
standard purpose for a limit on the time when
criminal actions may be commenced is certain-an
accused should not be compelled to defend against
charges after evidence necessary to refute them
has been forgotten, lost or obscured.' The period
of limitation begins to run when an offense is
committed. Usually this occurs when all the ele-
ments of the crime appear 4 However, the "con-
tinuing offense" doctrine provides that the statute
of limitations does not commence its run until any
continuity in the commission of otherwise complete
offenses has ceased.
For example, assume a five-year statute of
limitations and an indictment for a conspiracy to
defraud. Assume also that all the elements of the
crime have been completed by 1960. If an indict-
ment is brought in 1967 based upon acts done in
1966 that were necessary to effectuate the fraudu-
lent end, courts have held that the 1966 acts are
part of a continuing conspiracy. Thus the defend-
ants involved will be forced to refute evidence of
their 1960 conduct.0 5 As to evidence of the earliest
tinues the result but not the offense. See United States v.
Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
"See Commonwealth v. Foster, 111 Pa. Super. 451,
170 A. 691 (1934), where defendant was indicted on
September 20, 1932, for aiding and abetting the em-
bezzlement of funds from a trust company on September
28, 1928. Defendant claimed that since his was a crime
separate from that of the principal offender and was
defined as a misdemeanor, the indictment was barred
by the two-year period of limitation. The court cited
two separate statutes and argued that the abettor was
liable to be proceeded against in the same manner as the
principal offender against whom a four-year period of
limitations was applicable. On a rather narrow point,
the court held for the defendant, stating:
An act of limitation is an act of grace, and,
in order for the commonwealth to include certain
offenders within a limitation covering a specific
class both as to individuals and offenses, it must
point to some legislative authority clearly showing
its intent to enlarge and broaden the scope of the
original act. 111 Pa. Super. at 456; 170 A. at 692.
13 See generally Note, The Statute of Limitations in
Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1954); Callahan, Statutes of Limia-
tion-Background, 16 OHmo S. L.J. 130 (1955).
14 For example, the elements of a crime under § 12(a)
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
50 U.S.C. App., § 462(a) (1968), are: 1) a determination
that there is a duty (i.e., to register, to report, etc.)
and 2) a criminal intent. See PUBLIC LAW EDUCATION
INsTrrUTE, SExrcTVE SERVICE LAW ,EPoRTER § 2527
(1968).11 See United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436 (2d
acts, the purpose of the statute of limitations has
been circumvented. The "continuing offense"
doctrine for all practical purposes extends the
statute beyond its stated term." 
1 6
However, the fact that the purpose of the statute
of limitations may be thwarted does not mean
that the "continuing offense" doctrine is unac-
ceptable or that an "offense should never be
construed as a continuing one." 17 A problem
arises, however, in the demarcation of those of-
fenses that are "continuing" for purpose of the
statute of limitations. The Court's opinion in
Toussie v. United States stands for the proposition
that since the statute of limitations is entirely a
creature of legislators, the "continuing offense"
doctrine, at odds with the purposes of the statute,
should not be invoked without explicit support of
the legislature with regard to specific crimes, 8
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Black
insisted that an offense will be held to be continu-
ous only if: 1) "the nature of the crime involved is
such that Congress must assuredly have intended
it be treated as a continuing one," or 2) "the
explicit language of the substantive criminal
statute compels such a conclusion."'' 9 For pur-
poses of the statute of limitations, if a crime does
not meet the criteria of either category, then
courts are powerless to declare that offense con-
tfnuous.0
Indeed, certain offenses are by their very nature
"continuous." In United States v. Kissel,2- for
instance, the defendants were indicted for con-
spiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sher-
man Act. They argued that their offense was
complete in December, 1903, the date of the un-
lawful agreement, and that later acts did not
change the nature of the offense. Thus, they argued
that an indictment filed in 1909 was barred by the
Cir. 1939), where defendants were indicted for con-
spiring to use the U.S. mail in furtherance of an in-
genious confidence racket by which different individuals
were defrauded. The indictment was based upon three
letters that were delivered within the period of limita-
tion. The Court held that these letters were part of a
continuing conspiracy, and thus the defendants were
forced to refute evidence of earlier acts that would have
been barred except for the declaration that the con-
spiracy was continuous. As to these acts the purpose of
the statute of limitations appears to have been circum-
vented.
'
8 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).




' 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
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three-year statute of limitations. Mr. Justice
Holmes rejected their claim and held that the
conspiracy in question was designed as an ongoing
attempt to drive competitors out of business.
Criminal conduct, then, continued until that
purpose was achieved or abandoned.
It is true that the unlawful agreement satisfies
the definition of the crime, but it does not exhaust
it. It also is true, of course, that the mere con-
tinuance of the result of a crime does not con-
tinue the crime.... But when the plot contem-
plates bringing to pass a continuous result that
will not continue without the continuous coopera-
tion of the conspirators to keep it up, and there
is such continuous cooperation, it is a perversion
of natural thought and of natural language to call
such continuous cooperation a cinematographic
series of distinct conspiracies, rather than to call
it a single one.2
In Toussie v. United States, the Court cited
Kissel with approval and noted that it is in the
nature of a conspiracy that each day's conspira-
torial acts renew the evil which the appropriate
criminal statute seeks to prevent. However, after
noting that the first Selective Service provisions
22 Id. at 607. In State v. Thang, 188 Minn. 224, 246
N.W. 891 (1933), a guardian originally acted to em-
bezzle funds in 1926, but in order to prevent detection
he continued his crime by a series of fraudulent reports
and letters. The court held the embezzlement was a
continuing offense not barred by the statute of limita-
tions. See also Richardson v. State, 7 Boyce 534, 109 A.
124 (Del. 1920), where the court considered the nature
of the offense of failure to provide support. The de-
fendant father claimed that since he had never provided
for the support of his illegitimate child, the statute of
limitations had run two years after the child's birth.
The court held that, whereas the defendant's contention
would have barred a prosecution under the bastardy
act, the father had a continuing duty to provide sup-
port. His was a crime of continuous omission.
But see United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450 (1878),
where an attorney had withheld a certain sum which he
had collected, on behalf of his client, from a United
States pension fund. The pensioner requested her
money in December, 1870, and was refused. It was not
until five years later that the attorney was indicted.
With the two-year statute of limitations pleaded as a
bar to the indictment, the state argued that each day
funds were withheld constituted a continuing offense.
The Court rejected prosecution's argument and as-
serted:
It is unreasonable to hold that twenty years after
this he could be indicted for wrongfully withholding
the money, and be put to prove his innocence after
his receipt is lost, and when perhaps the pensioner
is dead ... Whenever the act or series of acts neces-
sary to constitute a criminal withholding of the
money have transpired, the crime is complete, and
from that day the Statute of Limitations begins
to run against the prosecution. 98 U.S. at 452.
of World War I treated draft registration as an
instantaneous event,23 the Court concluded that
"there is nothing inherent in the nature of failing
to register that makes it a continuing offense." 24
Other crimes as well are not by their very nature
continuous but may, in light of statutory defini-
tion of the crime, be construed as continuing.26
The clearest illustration of this category rests
with the offense of bigamy. In Pitts v. State,26 the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that its penal
codeP defined bigamy as a marriage by one who
knows of the existence of an initial spouse. Thus,
under Georgia law, the crime of bigamy was com-
plete upon the consummation of such a marriage.
Elsewhere, however, bigamy might well be termed
a continuous offense. Indeed, statutes in other
jurisdictions define the crime as "continuous
cohabitation" under an illegal second marriage.2 8
Likewise, in United States v. Cores, 19 the Supreme
Court considered whether an alien crew member
The Court took notice that historically a single
day was proclaimed as the time when all men who were
subject to duty must register. Thus, on June 5, 1917,
10,000,000 men registered. The following year August
24, 1918, was proclaimed registration day for all those
who had become subject to the duty to register since
the previous year. In like manner, the Court argued,
the proclamation in 1942-that all men must register
upon their eighteenth birthday-was simply an auto-
matic scheme for an annual registration day. Toussie v.
United States, 397 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1970).24 Id. at 122.
25 Cf. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412
(1943), in which the obverse of this situation occurred.
The defendants had by fraud induced the Court to
issue a corrupt settlement of litigation. The prosecution
contended that the success of the scheme depended upon
continuous acts necessary for the concealment of the
plan. The same argument was forwarded in United
States v. Kissel, supra note 21. However, the Court
held that the action was barred by the statute of limita-
tions because the statute upon which the prosecution
based its case punished only misbehavior in the "pres-
ence of the Court." If it were not for the wording of the
statute, Acts of Apr. 13, 1876, ch. 56, 19 Stat. 32; Nov.
17, 1921, ch. 124, § 1, 42 Stat. 220; Dec. 27, 1927, ch. 6,
45 Stat. 51 (now 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964)), the fraudu-
lent scheme would have been a continuous crime.
26 147 Ga. 801, 95 S.E. 706 (1918).
17 GA. CODE ANw. ch. 26, § 5601 (1933), defines
bigamy as "knowingly having a plurality of husbands
or wives at the same time."
8 State v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 7 N.W. 516 (1880),
which held that bigamy was a continuing offense and
thus not barred by the statute of limitations, concerned
a statute which read:
if any person who has a former husband or wife
living marry another person, or continue to cohabit
with such second husband ... [he] is guilty of
bigamy.
See also Cox v. State, 117 Ala. 103, 23 So. 806 (1898).
29 356 U.S. 405 (1958).
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who remained in the United States in excess of
allotted time" was guilty of a continuing offense.
It reasoned that the conduct proscribed by § 252(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act" "is the
affirmative act of willfully remaining, and the
crucial word 'remains' permits no connotation
other than continuing presence." ' 2
The Court in Toussie undertook a similiar
examination of the statutory language invoked
against the petitioner. The majority33 insisted
that the Universal Military and Training Act"
contained "no language ... that clearly con-
templated a prolonged course of conduct." 15
10 The government filed an information in the Untied
States District Court for the District of Connecticut
charging that the appellee alien crewman landed at
Philadelphia on April 27, 1955 and that twenty-nine
days later, at the expiration of his conditional landing
permit, he "did wilfully and knowingly remain in the
United States, to wit: Bethel, Connecticut." The
facts showed however that appellee came to Connecticut
only after spending a year in New York and indicated
that the information was brought in an improper dis-
trict since appellee was not in Connecticut at the time
his permit expired. The Constitution (U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2) makes it clear that proper venue "shall be
in the state where the said crime shall have been com-
mitted." The Court, holding that the offense was
continuing, stated that the locality of the crime ex-
tended over the whole area through which the appellee
moved. Thus the information was properly filed. Id. at
406-07, 410.218 U.S.C. § 1282(c) (1964).
12United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408 (1959).
But see United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182, 186-
187 (7th Cir. 1951), where an allen failed to register
in violation of Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, title III,
§31, 54 Stat. 673 (now covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1302
(1964)), which reads:
(a) It shall be the duty of every alien now or here-
after in the United States, who ... (3) remains
in the United States for thirty days or longer,
to apply for registration ... before the expira-
tion of such thirty days.
It would appear that the crime is complete after the
expiration of the thirty days, but the court held that
the defendant's failure to register was a continuing
violation which was not barred by a three-year statute
of limitations.33The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Black, with whom were Justices Douglas, Marshall,
Brennan, and Stewart. Mr. Justice White, with whom
were the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan, dis-
sented.
34 50 U.S.C. App., §543 (1964). The statute reads:
[It shall be the duty of every male citizen...
who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any
subsequent registration, is between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and
submit to registration at such time or times and
place or places, and in such manner, as shall be
determined by proclamation of the President and
by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
25 397 U.S. at 120.
Even though the statutory language established
no continuing offense, the government argued
that the language of a Presidential order 6 in ques-
tion designated registration as a continuing duty,
rendering the crime of failure to register a con-
tinuing one. Justice Black, speaking for the Court,
insisted that
[wihile it is true that the regulation does in ex-
plicit terms refer to registration as a continuing
duty, we cannot give it the effect of making this
criminal offense a continuing one. Since such
offenses are not to be implied except in limited
circumstances, and since questions of limitations
are fundamentally matters of legislative not
administrative decision, we think this regulation
should not be relied upon effectively to stretch a
five-year statute of limitations into a thirteen year
one, . .. 37
unless either: 1) the statute itself, apart from the
regulation, or 2) the nature of the crime involved
justifies that conclusion.2
2632 C.F.R. § 1611.7(c) (1970). The Presidential
order reads:
The duty of every person subject to registration
to present himself for and submit- to registration
shall continue at all times, and if for any reason
any such person is not registered on the day or
one of the days fixed for his registration, he shall
immediately present himself for and submit to reg-
istration.
3' 39 7 U.S. at 120-21.33 Justice Black also thought it significant that the
cases which have concluded, on facts practically iden-
tical to those in Toussie, that failure to register for
the draft was a continuing offense have done so by
relying on the regulation. See McGregor v. United
States, 206 F.2d 583, 584 (4th Cir. 1953); Fogel v.
United States, 162 F.2d 54,55 (5th Cir. 1947). However,
in United States v. Salberg, 287 F. 208 (N.D. Ohio)
(1923), a case which differed from Toussie only in that
there was no regulation defining a "continuing duty,"
the Court tersely ruled that the offense was complete
five days after the eighteenth birthday.
Cf. United States v. Guertler, 147 F.2d 796 (2d
Cir. 1945), where the Court held that an indictment
filed in 1944 charging a failure to keep the draft board
advised during the period between 1941 and 1942 of an
address where mail would reach him was a continuing
offense not barred by a three-year period of limitation.
The offense was described in an executive order, 3
C.F.R. 727 (1940), made pursuant to §11 of the Selec-
tive Service Training Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 894 (now
covered by 50 U.S.C. §462 (1964)). That order read:
"it shall be the duty of each registrant to keep his local
board advised at all times of the address where mail
will reach him." (emphasis added) Query: For pur-
poses of the statute of limitation, would a violation of
this executive order still be construed as a "continuing
offense?" In view of Toussie, it would appear that the
words "at all times" would have no effect; but since.
the crime is in nature continuing, failure to keel the
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